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HOW TO APPLY THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
NELSON POTTER JR.
"Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will as a
universal law.,,1 Many have thought that this formulation of the
categorical imperative could not be successfully applied to particular
moral situations to determine what kinds of actions are right and
wrong. Others have thought that it could be, and have defended
Kant against his critics. Much has been written about Kant's famous
four examples in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
(Gnmdlegung), both to criticize and to defend Kant's sample
application arguments. In fact, the application of the categorical
imperative is by now a well worn topic.
The aim of the present paper is to give a new positive
interpretation of how the categorical imperative is to be applied.
There have been critiques of Kant's applications and defenses of
Kant against such criticism, but it is surprisingly seldom that a
positive interpretation of how the categorical imperative is to be
applied has been offered.2
The present interpretation is presented by giving an account of
the second of Kant's four examples in the Grundlegung3 - the
argument against making a lying promise. In certain ways this
application - a derivation of a perfect duty to others - may serve as
amodel for other applications, though there are also important ways
in which imperfect duties and duties to oneself are different from
such a duty. Also, the kind of application set forth here is based on
the doctrine of the Grundlegung, with some supplementation from
Kant's later ethical works; but it does not take into account, for
example, the detailed and quite different account of the application
of the categorical imperative in the Metaphysics of Morals. In the
context of that work the making of a lying promise would either be
aviolation of a contractual or property-right related obligation,4 and
hence fall under the philosophy of right (Recht), or else, as a lie be a
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violation of a duty of virtue. 5 In either case the categorical
imperative would be applied in a different way than it is in the
Grundlegung. Nevertheless, the argument from the Grundlegung is of
some interest, because it is a good model of a Kantian derivation of a
specific moral obligation. Further, the Grundlegung is the work by
Kant that most are familiar with; thus in terms of the general
debates concerning Kant's ethics, it is perhaps most important to see
how the categorical imperative as it is discussed in that work can be
successfully applied.
Though the lying promise argument comes from the Grundle-
gung, other elements of the present interpretation- for example,
the account of the nature of "maxims" - draw significantly upon
Kant's later writings on ethics. It is necessary and unavoidable to
range more widely in developing an interpretation of the application
of the categorical imperative, for it is impossible to give an adequate
account of that topic using only the information concerning Kant's
views that the Grundlegung gives us.
Further, there are certain elements of the present account that
go beyond what Kant himself said, but that are compatible with
what Kant does say, and that serve to complete and indeed to make
possible a successful application of the categorical imperative; this is
particularly true of the discussion of action- and end-description in
the last part of the essay.
The claim of this paper is only that the categorical imperative
can be successfully applied to particular kinds of action to determine
which are right and which are wrong according to that principle.
This paper does not claim to show that the categorical imperative is
a true or correct moral principle, or that the particular kinds of
actions said to be morally right or wrong according to a successfully
applied categorical imperative are indeed morally right or wrong as
that principle says.
In Section I a criterion of success for the application of the
categorical imperative will be proposed and commented upon. In
Section II an interpretation of the Kantian conception of a maxim is
developed for use in what follows. Section III will set forth the
lying-promise argument as it is found in the Grundlegung, make a
few comments on it, and propose an interpretation of the alleged
"contradiction" that results from the attempt to universalize an
immoral maxim. Section IV will take up the criticism that Kant has
no way of determining how an action shall be described for the
purposes of moral evaluation; if this criticism is correct, then
attempts to apply the categorical imperative cannot be successful. I
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shall propose a way of answering the criticism.
A successful application of the categorical imperative consists of
an argument having only one moral premise (the categorical impera-
tive), and whatever true factual and causal empirical premises are
needed, from which a conclusion concerning the moral rightness or
wrongness of some particular kind of action follows.
A number of comments on this criterion of successful appli-
cation are appropriate:
(1) Some interpreters 6 have thought that Kant thought that the
categorical imperative could be applied to derive particular moral
conclusions without the use of any empirical propositions at all. This
is an incorrect interpretation of Kant. 7 Empirical premises may be
used in the successful derivation of particular moral obligations
according to him.
(2) Hegel and others have regarded the categorical imperative,
first formulation, as a merely "formal" principle which was inade-
quate to deduce particular moral conclusions without the use of
subsidiary moral premises.1! This is perhaps the most common
interpretation-cum-criticism of Kant's moral philosophy. It will have
been shown false if there is a successful application of the categorical
imperative in the sense defined above, since the requirement is that
in such a moral argument there be only one moral premise, and no
subsidiary or additional moral premises.
(3) The categorical imperative is in the first instance a principle
that can be used to determine the rightness or wrongness of an
action - that is, to determine what actions are in accord with duty,
or not. Thus an action may be in accord with the categorical
imperative in the sense that it is right and not wrong, but it may be
an action not done from duty, and therefore not a morally good
action. A morally good action is a right (i.e., permissible) action that
is done because it is right.
II
The categorical imperative is applied to maxims. Kant tells us
that maxims are "subjective principles of action.,,9
"Subjective" for Kant means that which has reference to the
subject, belongs to the subject, springs from him, or has its ground in
him. lO As the term is used in Kant's ethical writings anything is
subjective that is dependent upon the empirical nature of the
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experiencing subject, and especially anything having to do with
feeling and desire. Thus a subjective principle of action is a principle
which springs from the agent's feelings or desires, and which is
efficacious only for his own action. In contrast imperatives and laws
are said to be objective, and hence are binding, not just upon the
agent who adopts or accepts them, but upon any rational agentY
The "subjectivity" of the maxim means, among other things,
that its adoption by an agent implies nothing concerning its efficacy
or bindingness upon the choice of others or concerning its moral
acceptability. Thus some maxims are in accord with objective
principles of right and wrong and others are not. Actions that flow
from the adoption of a maxim will ordinarily be right or wrong
according as the maxim is morally acceptable or not.
Kant tells us that maxims, like other kinds of principles, have a
"form" and a "matter.,,12 The matter of a maxim is "the object of
the Will.,,13 This "object of the will" is the end or goal of
the action mentioned in the maxim.14 Thus maxims include
as their "matter" the end of action. Kant tells us in the Metaphysics
of Morals that "every maxim contains an end."IS The doctrine that
maxims have a "matter" and thus mention an end or goal of action
is closely related to Kant's often expressed view that all action is for
the sake of an end. 16 Kant is less clear about what the "form" of a
maxim is, but fortunately for our purposes it is not necessary to
arrive at an answer to this question.
When Kant puts forward examples of maxims, they are usually
stated as general policy decisions, which call for the performance of
a certain kind of action. For example, Kant speaks of "the maxim of
getting out of a difficulty by a false promise."I? And he states the
maxim of suicide as follows: "From self-love I make it mv principle
to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it
promises pleasure."ll1 Both of these examples call for the per-
formance of a certain kind of action, and seem to indicate that the
action is to be done for the sake of a certain end. The end of action
in the first example is that of being out of a difficulty. The phrase
"from self-love" in the second example may be taken as a gener-
alized reference to the end of being happy or avoiding pain.
Thus to adopt a maxim is to choose to perform a certain kind of
action for the sake of a certain kind of end, and the statement of the
maxim should include a description of the action and the end to
which the action is a means. 19
The following comments concerning maxims and Kant's general
philosophy of action may be useful:
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(1) It may be objected to Kant's concept of a maxim that it
implies an overintellectualized conception of action, according to
which we are implicitly or explicitly following a rule whenever we
act. This objection is probably well taken. The idea that to act is to
have adopted a maxim of action implies a certain paradigm of
action, according to which the action is (a) chosen following
deliberation (rather than being merely voluntary), (b) a commission
rather than an omission, (c) one for which we are directly rather
than indirectly responsible, etc. The conception may, then, by
extension, be applied to other kinds of action by reference to this
paradigm. But many attempts to thus apply the paradigm to
non-paradigmatic examples will, no doubt, run into problems and
produce artificialities.
(2) For the purposes of the present essay it need not be insisted
that maxims include ends. This insistence becomes necessary only
when we move to consider two topics not taken up in this essay: (a)
the application of the categorical imperative to derive duties of
virtue, and (b) Kant's doctrine of freedom. It is only necessary here
to insist that in Kant's view all action is for the sake of an end, for
the end of action will have a key role to play in arriving at the
proper description of the action for the purposes of moral evalua-
tion.
(3) It may be asked whether Kant held to this understanding of
the importance of the end of action in all of his ethical works. For
Kant's view that all action, including action from duty, is for the
sake of some end, is an unfamiliar doctrine, particularly to persons
whose main reading in Kant's moral philosophy has been the
Grundlegung. The Grundlegung contains no clear statement for or
against the present interpretation of maxims or of the importance of
the ends of action. Thus it may be that when Kant wrote the
Grundlegung he had not thought through the significance of the role
of ends in moral philosophy and in action generally, within the
scope of his critical doctrine of ethics. However, there are quite clear
discussions of the significance of the ends of action in all three of
the later works on moral philosophy written during Kant's critical
period: The Critique of Practical Reason, Religion within the Limits
ofReason Alone, and Metaphysics ofMorals. The present account of
the importance of ends of action in relation to maxims is based
primarily on those later works.2o
(4) Still another limitation of the philosophy of action under-
lying the conception of the maxim is that Kant takes no account of
the possibility of an individual adopting competing maxims, con-
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flicting maxims, or maxims which have been adopted with varying
degrees of commitment; especially in view of the problems resulting
from conflicting maxims, it might be best to understand a "ceteris
paribus" clause as attached to adopted maxims.21
III
Let us now turn to the lying-promise example of the application
of the categorical imperative. We may restate Kant's famous second
example 22 as follows: Our agent, A, is in financial difficulties, and
needs money to stave off financial disaster. He knows he can get the
money he needs from his well-to-do friend, B. But he knows that he
can get money from B only as an informal loan, i.e., the money will
be given A upon A's promising B to pay it back at a certain time. He
arranges the loan, though he knows perfectly well that he will not be
able to repay it in the required time; thus when A promises B to
repay the loan, he is promising to do something that he has no
intention of doing. He is, in other words, making a lying promise. We
may tentatively formulate the maxim of the action as follows:
"Make a lying promise in order to get the money you need."
Let us suppose in the discussion that follows that there are no
other major facts morally relevant to the case such as the
following: the financial disaster that will accrue to B if the loan is
not repaid; the bond of friendship that has existed between A and B
for years, and which would be violated by A's making a lying
promise; the availability of other means of getting the money; the
utilitarian or teleological assessment that A ought or ought not to do
what he is thinking of; the possibility that A will have to pay much
more in the long run for making the lying promise than he would if
he didn't, so that his act would be imprudential; the fact that B got
his money dishonestly; the fact that the social system in which the
two men live is such that it unjustly benefits B and injures A. Any
such factors, if they obtained, might be relevant to the judgments
that A ought or ought not to make the promise, and more than
likely they would be relevant to some of the practical judgments
that may surround the proposed action.
Kant tells us in the first formulation that we are to test our
proposed maxims by regarding them as "universal laws" or "uni-
versal laws of nature. ,,23 To do this A will imagine his maxim to be a
general psychological law to the effect that whenever someone is in
circumstances similar to his and wants to get money he will make a
promise to repay, even if he knows that he will not be able to do so.
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'This imagined new psychological law (the cause is the desire to have
the money and the effect is the making of the lying promise) is
mperimposed upon the world as we know it, and the question is
asked: What would be the result if there were such a law?
It should be noted that the "psychological law" we have
mentioned is not in fact true. That is, it is not the case that
Ilhenever someone finds himself in need of money in circumstances
like those of A he will invariably make a lying promise in order to
iet it. Moral persons would not do such a thing, for example, and if
they, or anyone else, have a will to avoid that action, they are,
ordinarily, successful in avoiding it.
If we treat the maxim in this way as a law of nature, we suppose
that whenever anyone wants or needs money and can get it by
making a lying promise, he does in fact make a lying promise. The
result of such a practice would be, we may suppose, that people
would come to know the existence of this causal law and would no
longer believe or put trust in promises made in such circumstances.
And the effect of this would be that a person could no longer gain
his end by making a lying promise. If this estimate of the results is
correct, then the effect of such a universal law of nature would be
that no one would be able to achieve his end of getting money by
making a lying promise. If universalizing the maxim has the result
that it is impossible to achieve the end mentioned in the maxim by
performing the action mentioned in the maxim, then Kant says that
there is a "contradiction" and that we "cannot will" the maxim as a
universal law. The categorical imperative says that maxims that
cannot be willed as universal laws ought not to be acted upon; thus
the lying promise maxim ought not to be acted upon.
Kant's statement that maxims which are violations of perfect
duties result in a "contradiction" when they are universalized24 is
one that has caused bewilderment to his interpreters and glee to his
critics. Where is the contradiction in our example? It lies between
the causal belief that is presupposed by the maxim of making a lying
promise, viz., that such action will be efficacious in getting one the
money, and the result of that maxim's becoming a universal law of
nature, viz., that such an action will not be so efficacious. These two
statements contradict one another, and a world in which the maxim
is a universal law having the empirical consequences mentioned, and
where the maxim's presupposed causal belief is also true is impos-
sible.
The following comments on this example may be made:
(1) It was proposed that we limit our discussion to a limited
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number of morally relevant facts about the example; my way of
stating the limitation suggested that moral judgments made on the
basis of such facts be regarded as defeasible should other morally
relevant facts be presented. Kant seems to think that on the basis of
considerations of the kinds we have mentioned he can arrive at a
conclusive judgment that making a lying promise is as such wrong,
regardless of what other circumstances may obtain. That is, Kant
seems not to accept the view that moral judgments are provisional
because they may be overturned by additional knowledge. He may
have thought that complete or final empirical knowledge, e.g., of the
truth of certain laws of nature, or of the morally relevant charac·
teristics of an action, was possible. Or he may have thought that a
moral judgment made in the light of all the relevant beliefs possessed
by the person who makes the judgment is a true and final moral
judgment; that is, his conception of duty may be more "inner" or
"subjective" than the view that moral judgments admit of being
overturned by additional knowledge.
In his discussions of the application of the categorical impera-
tive Kant does not ordinarily distinguish between the agent's beliefs
concerning an action and the facts concerning that action; that is, he
does not discuss cases of ignorance of fact, and thus his views
concerning the relation between duty and ignorance of fact do not
emerge clearly. This is probably because he aims deliberately to
consider only cases that are idealized in the respect that ignorance of
fact is not an issue. In discussing Kant's ethics it is thus useful to
simply suppose that the person making the moral judgment was not
lacking any relevant knowledge.
(2) The maxim in the example mentioned a proposed action
that was a means to an end also mentioned in the maxim. Thus the
maxim presupposes whatever empirical-causal knowledge is neces-
sary to know that the proposed action would be the cause of the
end.
(3) The end mentioned in the maxim is never morally evil, in
Kant's view, and we can never establish by considering the end of
action alone a presumption that an action for the sake of that end is
morally wrong. In the tentative statement of A's maxim, the end was
described as "having money." Such an end is an intermediate end,
i.e., a means to a further end, perhaps the end of A's having his
creditors paid, and that is perhaps a means to the end of A's being
able to continue to enjoy a life of comfort and the respect of his
fellows, and those latter ends A perhaps desires for the sake of his
own personal happiness. The last mentioned end is not an inter-
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mediate end. Any intermediate end of action which is not adopted
out of moral considerations can be traced back to the desire for
one's own happiness, in Kant's view.25 One's own happiness as an
end of action is not morally pejorative but morally neutral. The
means to that end mayor may not be narrowly selfish, for example;
they may even be altruistic as in the case of a person who helps
another because of the satisfaction he would take in that other's
happiness. Though such ends are morally neutral, they are all, of
course, non-moral goods.
(4) The categorical imperative thus applied is not a utilitarian
principle, for two reasons: (a) In no case are we to consider actual
consequences of an agent's performing a given action. We are to
consider only consequences of the universal adoption of a maxim of
action. (b) In the present case we are not concerned with the
value-consequences of the universal adoption of a maxim of action,
in the way that perhaps a certain kind of rule utilitarian might be.
We are concerned only with the results of such a universal adoption
of the maxim, with respect to the state of affairs mentioned in the
maxim as the end of action. That is, we are concerned with such
results in a nonvaluational way - we are only interested in whether
certain results will flow from certain hypothetical circumstances,
and thus our judgments of such results are in the nature of scientific
predictions, rather than utilitarian estimates of value consequences.
Let us now review the application procedure, in a series of
steps:
(1) "Make a lying promise in order to get the money you need," is a
proposed maxim.
(2) That maxim presupposes (implies) the following causal state-
ment: "By making a lying promise in the proper circumstances,
I shall be able to get the money I need."
The maxim in (1) mentioned a proposed end (having needed
money) and a proposed means to that end. The statement men-
tioned in (2) simply says that the action in question is a means to
that same end.
(3) If everyone adopted this maxim, the result would be that one
would not be able to get the money he needed by making a
lying promise (in the same circumstances).
This is an empirical premise, a prediction of what would happen
if everyone adopted the maxim mentioned earlier. The empirical
evidence for or against (3) can be regarded as part of the argument
by which an application of the categorical imperative is made. For
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some maxims, the analogue of (3) may be difficult to arrive at; that
is, it is often difficult to estimate what the consequences of the
universal adoption of a given maxim may be. Kant was probably not
sufficiently aware of such difficulties.
(4) For the maxim mentioned in (1) the presupposed causal
statement (mentioned in (2)) and the result of the universal
adoption of the maxim (mentioned in (3)) are contradictory.
(5) A maxim whose presupposed causal belief (mentioned in (2))
contradicts the results of its universal adoption (mentioned in
(3)) is one that cannot be willed as a universal law .
(4) simply notes a fact about elements of (2) and (3), and (5) is
analytic.
(6) One ought to act only on maxims that can be willed as a
universal law.
This is the categorical imperative, Kant's moral principle, given
as a statement of obligation.26
(7) One ought not to adopt the maxim mentioned in (I). (From
(1), (4), (5), (6).)
The only moral principle used in this derivation procedure was
(6). Thus this procedure and the argument associated with it meet
the requirement for a successful application of the categorical
imperative set forth in Section 1 of this paper.
But an assumption of this procedure is that we have available a
unique, correct statement of the maxim, and thus a unique, correct
description of the proposed action and the end of action. This
assumption may not be correct; it must be examined in the next part
of this essay.
IV
There 'are an unlimited number of possible true descriptions of
any action. Since moral evaluation of the action will depend upon
the description of the action that is used, we must discover how we
are to describe the action, and to evaluate a maxim we must discover
both how to describe the action, and how to describe the end
mentioned in the maxim. This is a challenge to the example of
application of the categorical imperative just put forward, for in
order to proceed with the evaluation, we proposed a formulation of
the maxim. But we had no reason to think that that formulation was
more correct than some other: a different statement of the maxim
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would have yielded a different result when the Kantian moral test
was applied.
Did Kant have an adequate procedure for arriving at the correct
formulation of the maxim for the purposes of moral evaluation?
Jonathan Harrison expresses serious doubts:
Is it the case that, if an action is wrong, no maxim which would
enjoin it can be universalized? Against this there is a very
formidable objection, which I am not sure can be answered. It is
this: Given any wrong action, you can find a maxim for it which
is so specific that it enjoins that action and no other??
W.D. Ross thinks we have here a serious objection to Kant; he states
the issue clearly:
Kant's error seems to lie in this: Any individual act is an
instance of a class of acts which is a species of a wider class
which is a species of a still wider class; we can set no limit to the
degrees of specification which may intervene between the
summum genus 'act' and the individual act. For example, if C
tells a lie to the would-be-murderer, this falls (i) under the
sub-species 'lies told to murderous persons', (ii) under the
species 'lies', (iii) under the genus 'statements.' Kant pitches,
arbitrarily, on the middle one of these three class~s, and since
acts of this class are generally wrong, and are indeed always
prima facie wrong, he says that the particular lie is wrong....
We seem, then, to be in an impasse. The test of universalizability
applied at one level of abstractness condemns the act; applied at
another level of abstractness it justifies it. And since the
principle itself does not indicate at what level of abstractness it
is to be applied, it does not furnish us with a criterion of the
correctness of maxims, and of the righ tness of acts that conform
to them.2B
Kant himself seems never to have been aware of this problem. He
seems to have assumed that he had readily available a proper
description of the action. Indeed, what we may cal1 the problem of
"relativity of action-descriptions" is one that has come to the fore
only in the twentieth-century. But (1) is there perhaps a solution to
this problem implicit in what Kant writes - and clearly enough there
that we can call it a "Kantian" solution? Or (2) is there some
solution that could be supplied by an interpreter of Kant, that
would solve the problem and make possible the application of the
categorical imperative? Or (3) is there no solution of any kind
forthcoming to the problem that Harrison and Ross propose? If
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there is no solution then any attempt to apply the categorical
imperative so as to derive particular ethical conclusions, in the way
proposed at the outset, must fail.
I shall show that there may be hints of a solution along the lines
of (1) above, but that it does not carry us far enough. I will then
propose a solution along the lines of (2); if this solution is successful,
an affirmative answer to question (3) will have been avoided.
(1) The following reply might be made on Kant's behalf. Kant
emphasizes (especially in the Religion 29 ) the importance of the spirit
as opposed to the letter of the law. Suppose a person makes a lying
promise and then justifies that action by reference to the principle:
All red haired persons under five feet ten inches and over thirty-five
years of age may make lying promises on Tuesday afternoons in
May. It might be said that though perhaps a person so acting is
obeying the letter of the law, he is clearly not following the spirit of
the law. There is somehow a disingenuousness, a lack of sincerity, in
any such justification. Hence, the importance to Kant's philosophy
and in particular to the application of the categorical imperative of
the conception of the "spirit of the law." But there are some
difficulties with this line of reply. How do we tell whether a given
maxim is contrary to the spirit of the law or not? Unless we answer
this question, the decision as to whether or not a given maxim is
contrary to the spirit of the law or not is arbitrary. But the concept
of the "spirit of the law" was itself introduced to overcome such an
arbitrariness in the application of the categorical imperative to
maxims. Therefore, to say that our statement of the maxim should
accord with the spirit of the law seems to be uninformative.
Let us try a somewhat different direction of attack. We are
inclined to say that a person who states his maxim ad hoc in order to
justifY some action of his is being insincere in the sense that he could
not possibly make a lying promise where among his reasons for
doing as he did were, for example, that he had red hair, was over
thirty-five, and was making the promise on a Tuesday afternoon in
May. The spirit of the law requires, it might be said, simply that the
reasons mentioned in the maxim be the agent's reasons for acting as
he does, or to put it a bit differently, that the description of the
action performed be the description under which the agent in fact
performs the action. If we know the description under which a
person performs an action, we know something of his intentions and
motives, and these do not admit of arbitrary change or artificial
construction. The reason why the demands of the spirit of the law
are violated by some descriptions of an action is that it is clear that
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mch self-serving descriptions of the action are not the descriptions
under which the agent performs the act. And it is fair that the
agent's action be judged according to the description under which he
performs the act, for it is, after all, his own description; no account
of the action is, as it were, being arbitrarily imposed from without.
(2) But what determines the description under which the
agent performs an action? The agent performs the action as a
means to some end of his; if we describe the action as a means to
that end, we have at least the beginning of a description of the
action that is the agent's description. That is, we describe the
agent's action as a cause of the achievement of the end.30
It might be thought that whatever properties of the proposed
action are causally relevant to the achievement of the agent's end
are morally relevant properties of that action. But according to
such an understanding of "causal relevancy", a great many prop-
erties of the action which are obviously not morally relevant
properties of the action would be causally relevant. For example,
if the promisor approached the promisee about a loan on a
Tuesday afternoon in May, and at 4: 15 p.m. the promisee asked
the promisor whether he promised to repay the money, then the
fact that the promisor made his promise at 4: 15 p.m. on a
Tuesday afternoon in May would be a morally relevant property
of the action. The promisor must make the promise (we may
suppose) when he is asked to do so if he is to get the money. In
general, a great many characteristics of the action that intuitively
are morally irrelevant - in particular the time and place of the
action - will be said to be morally relevant features of the action
according to this criterion. Indeed, an action described according
to this criterion would no longer be a general description of a kind
of action, and thus would not be a suitable description to be
included in a maxim of action.
The causal relevancy criterion we are interested in must thus
be a criterion of generalized causal relevancy, a criterion that will
yield us, not a particular-action description, but a description of a
general kind of action. Thus the only properties of the action that
will be mentioned are those that are causally relevant in a law-like
statement of the kind that the maxim is.
The law-like statement which states a causal connection be-
tween the action and its end will be one in which characteristics
of the action are mentioned which make it a causally sufficient
condition for the end, not properties which make it a necessary
condition. If there are ,any alternative means of realizing a given
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end (and there almost always are) then very few, and perhaps no
properties of the proposed action will be necessary conditions.
Further, intuitively, when a person has a certain end, he is
interested in courses of action that will result in the achievement
of his end, i.e., that will be sufficient to bring it about.
It might be objected here that if the proposed action is being
described as a causally sufficient condition for the achievement of
the end, then since there are almost always a large number of
alternative means to a given end, a statement of sufficient con-
ditions for the achievement of a given end would consist of a long
disjunctive list of rather particular kinds of actions, each of which
is a sufficient condition for the achievement of the end of action.
Since the Kantian maxim only mentions one proposed kind of
action, we cannot yet have an account of the description of
actions that is adequate for formulating such a maxim. But, in
reply, it must be recalled that in attempting to formulate a
Kantian maxim, we begin our moral deliberation by thinking
about an individual action. We are thus seeking a description of it.
Thus there could not be a disjunctive list mentioning other actions
as well.
We shall thus describe our proposed action as a means to the
agent's end, in the following way: Its description will be the one
that occurs in a true law-like statement that describes the action
by mentioning those properties that make it a causally sufficient
condition for the end. In the place of "true" some may want to
write "well-confirmed" or perhaps "as well-confirmed as possible,
under the circumstances." The thought would be that frequently
we must act with less than ideal knowledge of the nature and
circumstances of our action; since this is the case, "true" or
"well-confirmed" may seem too strong, since frequently our
beliefs concerning the proposed action and its consequences are
neither true nor well-confirmed. I prefer "true", however, so that
we may say, when presented with better factual evidence that
causes us to change our mind, that our earlier judgment was
incorrect. However, it is worthwhile to take explicit note of the
fact that our circumstances of moral deliberation, choice and
action commonly are epistemically less than ideal.
We need only add the following requirement, for the pre-
liminary description of the action: that the law-like statement
from which we take our description of the action be as general a
statement as possible. If we suppose that we have the most general
statement of the law we are interested in, then, unless we added
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this proviso, we could arbitrarily add mentions of other properties
of the action to its description. The resulting statement would still
be a lawlike statement, and the action mentioned in it would still
have been properly described.
The criteria of moral relevancy thus far put forward are
adequate to exclude from its description a great many intuitively
irrelevant properties of the action, and they are adequate to bring
about the inclusion of many of the intuitively relevant properties
of the action, e.g., (probably) the fact that the proposed action is
one of promising.
Now let us imagine that everyone, whenever he might gain
something by a promise (i.e., whenever making a promise seems
the best and perhaps most convenient way of gaining some
personal end) does so. We are now imagining an indefinitely large
number of promises being used (over a period of time) to obtain
an equal number of personal ends. As we examine this large class
of promises, we find that the class of promise-making actions may
be divided into sub-classes that have significantly different con-
sequences with respect to the agent's promise-making ends.
Promises which are broken (i.e., are not performed, and there is
no mutual agreement or understanding about their non-
performance) have different consequences with respect to those
ends than those that are not brokenY In general, the keeping of
promises tends to result in the achievement of the promisor's ends
in promising, and the breaking of promises tends to frustrate those
ends. This is because past experience with broken promises tends
to make would-be promisees wary of accepting and acting on the
basis of new promises. Thus, in general, the keeping of promises is
among the set of conditions that are jointly sufficient conditions
for the achievement of all the ends for the sake of which the
promisors made their promises. Since we tend to describe actions
which are universalized in terms of those of their properties in
virtue of which they will fail to achieve their ends, we may, in
keeping with our causal criterion for describing actions, describe
the promise as a promise broken. Thus the breaking of promises
causes the non-achievement of promisor's ends, and we may con-
clude that according to the categorical imperative it is wrong to
break a promise.
But we may conclude more than this. We may conclude that
it is wrong to do that which results in the breaking of a promise,
providing we are responsible for that result. For example, if A has
promised to lend a book to B, but before B arrives A lends the
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book to C, A has done that which causes the breaking of a
promise; or if someone decides to visit the seashore on a day he
has promised to help a friend move, we might say that the
decision resulted in the breaking of the promise. Now in the case
of a lying promise (i.e., one which the promisor knows he will not
keep) the making of the promise is what results in the breaking of
the promise. That is, it is not some later decision, action, or
circumstance that results in a broken promise, but the very making
of the promise itself, since the promisor never intends to keep it.
This is perhaps clearest in the case that Kant describes in his
example: the promisor there knows that he cannot keep the
promise. Thus if it is wrong to break a promise, it is also wrong to
make a lying promise.
We have now shown how the description "lying promise" may
be attached to the action in our example. This is the description
we were after - the one that seems, intuitively, the proper
description for moral evaluation, and the one that may be used to
show our proposed action to be wrong, along with any other
action fitting the general description.
In describing the end as it is mentioned in the maxim, there
are two issues: (a) There is typically a series or chain of events
that are "ends", with all but the last being intermediate ends, i.e.,
ends that are also means. Which member of this chain is to be
mentioned? (b) Whichever of the "ends" along the chain we
choose, it may be described with greater or lesser generality. What
is the proper degree of generality for its description? For both of
these issues it will be possible only to give general suggestions for
describing the end of action, suggestions that will probably be
adequate to take care of most but not all cases.
Consider the following series of "ends", from the lying
promise example: (i) having the money (from the promise), (ii)
paying one's creditors, (iii) being free from harassment and
trouble, being able to retain possession of one's belongings, and
being able to retain the respect of one's neighbors, both for
oneself and one's family, (iv) continuing to be happy. In this
instance, it makes little difference which of these intermediate
ends we choose. Making a lying promise is equally the cause of all
of them. There may be other cases where choosing one member
rather than another makes a great difference; it is difficult to
know how to anticipate such cases. But it is useful to be aware of
the different members of the causal chain, so that one can be
aware of what difference such a choice of one member over
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mother might make. It is likely to be more convenient to choose
It end more immediate to the action, since the causal connections
lietween it and the proposed action will be less complex and thus
kss difficult to deal with. And finally, when we choose an inter-
~diate end for mention in a maxim, we should be careful to
Itscribe it as a means to the further ends.
(b) If the end of action is described in too narrow away,
'instances of the "universal law of nature" that are thereby
!pecified would be rare, and the effect of such a law might be
~~igible. Thus it might be possible to will certain maxims as a
IJIliversai law of nature whose actions are clearly wrong. An exam-
11e might be the following: "Make a lying promise, to the end of
getting exactly $1,537.36."
We must consider how to describe, not intermediate ends, but
more basic ends of action. Often intermediate ends are more
readily described than more basic ends. And the description of
mtermediate ends is dependent upon the description of more basic
ends.
Kant, when he thinks of actions based on desire, is thinking
of the common, psychologically based and physiologically based
motives or ends of action: ends like the having of food, drink,
!helter, friendship, sexual expression, and freedom from physical
pain: these are all motives or ends that are based in and deter-
mined by our empirical-subjective natures. The fulfillment of (for
example) the desire for freedom from physical pain, may be said
to be a part of happiness, and thus something desired for its own
sake. In understanding the nature of such ends and arriving at an
accurate description of them we need to make use of our know-
ledge of what Kant called "anthropology"- the empirical science
of man.
In arriving at an anthropologically based description of the
ends of action, we should follow the general scientific canon of
attempting to state the descriptions of such ends in as general and
theoretically powerful a way as possible. This point is similar to
the point made in the previous section concerning the causal
criterion of moral relevancy: Just as the law-like statement that
includes the description of the proposed action should be as
general a statement as possible, so should the description of the
end be as general as· is consistent with accurate theoretical descrip-
tion. Thus, if alternative descriptions of an end of action were
'eating chicken' and 'eating food,' the latter description should be
chosen.
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Kant, in determining the end or goal of action, frequently
seems to be using a common-sense psychology of the kind just
described. We commonly use a similar kind of "psychological
theory ," if it may be called that, in describing people's goals,
determining their motives, and judging their actions. 1t is always
possible that this "theory." like any empirical theory, may be
overturned,in part or in whole, by a new, better-grounded theory.
But even apart from such a possibility, there will be cases, psycho-
logically complicated cases, that it will be difficult to deal with:
cases of ambiguous motivation, of sadism and masochism, of
compulsive acts, the case of a person who kills out of an aesthetic
motive ("Her hair was an offense to humanity"), etc. The pro-
cedure for arriving at descriptions of the end of action using
common-sense psychology will not take care of these cases. Thus
the Kantian procedure for arriving at a description of the end of
action gives perhaps a reasonable approximation to the correct
description for many, but not for all cases.
There might seem to be serious problems in principle with the
generally causal-scientific descriptions of actions and of ends that
has been proposed. 1t might be said that the state of our empirical
knowledge of the world notoriously changes and advances, and
concomitantly so will our descriptions of actions and ends. But
this is a virtue, not a defect of the present account. We may never
have a final, absolutely correct account of action and of motiva·
tion -- and our descriptions of both may be expected to change
with changes in our empirical beliefs. This is one of several ways
in which the formulation of the maxim will be tentative and
defeasible; but all of these elements of uncertainty come from the
causal-factual knowledge that relates to the proposed action and
end. Our general theories and beliefs concerning law-like connec-
tions may change. Our knowledge of actions, and their conse-
quences, especially, perhaps, those only proposed, is commonly
incomplete. Sometimes there are difficult-to-deal-with borderline
cases. There are complexities resulting from pluralities of ends,
incompatibilities between the means to different ends (e.g.,
smoking may be a means to the end of present enjoyment or
absence of nervousness, but it tends to be incompatible with the
goal of a long, healthy life) and seemingly conflicting bases for
moral obligations. The requirement for a "single correct descrip-
tion for the purpose of moral evaluation" that we stated at the
outset does not, of course, imply that our proposed correct
description may never be revised. These complexities mean that,
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even if the basic principle· of morality has no indefiniteness or
uncertainty about it, our applications of it must be tentative,
guarded and careful.
To say all of this might seem to be leaving behind the Kantian
spirit of moral absolutism. But most of Kant's absolutistic perora-
tions have to do with the certainty, etc. of the basic principle of
morality, not its application. He takes note of the fact that
empirical knowledge is required for the application of the prin-
ciple. 32 And in the second half of the Metaphysics of Morals,
which is concerned with the application of the moral law, he
recognizes this most explicitly with his regular inclusion of
"casuistical questions", which he indicates have uncertain issues,
and to which, he thinks, no final answers can perhaps be given.33
But after this has been said, it must be admitted that Kant had
greater certainty about how actions are to be described for moral
evaluation, and that he was less alive to the uncertainty-inducing
factors that cause the author of this paper to be more tentative.
Harrison's worry and Ross' objection have now been answer-
ed. The excessive specificity of the maxim that Harrison was
concerned about is answered by generality requirements that the
action description not be an individual action description and that
the law-like causal statement connecting means and end be as
general as possible. Ross' objection that "the principle itself (i.e.,
the categorical imperative) does not indicate at what level of
abstractness it is to be applied," has been answered by specifying a
method for arriving at a proper description, at the proper level of
abstraction.
This procedure can scarcely be said to be implicit in Kant,
especially since Kant seemed unaware of the problems which it is
intended to solve. The only elements of this found in Kant are:
the doctrine that the maxim includes an end, discussed earlier, and
the concept of the "spirit of the law", as it was discussed in this
section, above. Thus the proposals for formulating the maxim
cannot be described as "Kantian," and the procedure outlined here
is a solution of type (2), mentioned earlier in this section. If it is
indeed a successful solution as I have claimed, then we have
avoided the conclusion that attempts to apply the categorical
imperative must fail. 34
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NOTES
For statements of this so called "first formulation" of the categorical
imperative see G, IV, 402, 422; Kdp V, V, 30. In this essay I shall not
distinguish between versions of the first formulation which simply mention
"universal law" and those which mention "universal laws of nature." (For
the latter formulation see G, IV, 421, 436.) I accept the view of L.W. Beck
(put forth in his A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 154ff.) and Paul
Dietrichson (put forth in his "When is a Maxim Fully Universalizable?"
Kant-Studien, Band 55, Heft 2 (1964), pp. 143-170) that the fIrst
formulation may only be applied by regarding the universalized maxim as a
law of nature. Note: The references to Kant's works are given in
abbreviated form. The page references are to the volume and page in Kants
Cesammelte Schriften. 22 volumes (Berlin: K;;niglich Preussischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902-42). Most English translations, in-
cluding all but one of those below, include the Akademie pagination in the
margins. The abbreviations for works by Kant that are cited, together with
the English translation of the work used are:
G - Crundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by H.]. Paton (London:
Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1956, third edition)
Kdp V - Kritik der prak tischen Vernunft, 1788.
Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis:
The Babbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956).
R _. Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793. Religion
within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by Theodore M. Greene and
Hoyt H. Hudson. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960) (This translation
does not include the Akademie pagination. References for this work will
include two page references, the first the Akademie edition page, the
second the Greene-Hudson edition page).
MdS - Metaphysik der Sitten, 1797. The fIrst half translated as The
Metaphysical Elements of Justice by John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1965). The second half translated as The Doctrine of Virtue by
Mary Gregor (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
2 A notable exception to this is H.J. Paton's The Categorical Imperative.
(London: Hutchinson & Co., fourth edition, 1963). I have criticized his'
interpretation in "Paton on the Application of the Categorical Imperative,"
Kant-Studien, Band 64, Heft 3 (1973), pp.411-422. Briefly, I argue there
as follows: Paton thinks that when a maxim is universalized in accord with
the fIrst formulation for the purpose of moral testing, it is to be regarded as
a teleological law of nature, and it is tested by seeing how the proposed law
fits in with nature regarded as a teleological systematic harmony of ends or
purposes. But (1) if Paton's interpretation is correct, then the categorical
imperative, fIrst formulation, cannot be successfully applied, since nature is
not a teleological system and there are no tnl~ teleological laws of nature.
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And (2) Paton's interpretation is not in fact correct, Kant never says that
maxims are to be regarded as teleological laws when being tested morally,
and there is no textual evidence for believing that he thought so. Paton's
interpretation is the result of (what I argue are) his incorrect accounts of
"maxim", and of the relation between the different versions of the first
formulation. A survey of recent literature on the application of the
categorical imperative is to be found in M.J. Scott-Taggart, "Recent Work
on the Philosophy of Kant" (American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 3,
Number 3 (July, 1966), pp. 171-209).
3 G, IV, 422.
4 Kant's account of property (which includes contracts) begins at MdS, VI,
245.
5 Somewhat surprisingly Kant regards lying, not as a violation of a duty to
another, but as a violation of a duty to oneself. MdS, VI, 238, 428f£.
6 For example, see A.C. Ewing, "The Paradoxes of Kant's Ethics," (Philo-
sophy, XII, 1933, pp. 40-56), p. 49.
7 For example, see G, IV, 412; MdS, VI, 217.
8 For versions of this charge, see G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right,
translated by T.M. Knox (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 90,
254. F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Selected Essays) (New York: The
Library of Liberal Arts Press, 1951 (originally published 1876)), p. 94.
Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, two volumes (London:
Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1907), Volume I, p. 110-111. C. D. Broad,
Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd.,
1930), p. 128.
9 See G, IV, 400n, 421n; Kdp V, V, 18-19; MdS, VI, 225.
10 See Rudolf Eisler, Kant-Lexikon (Hildesheim: Georg alms Verlagsbuch-
handlung, 190), pp. 515-6.
11 See G, 413, 421n; KdpV, V, 18-21.
12 KdpV, V, 26-27.
13 KdpV, V, 26-27.
14 See MdS, VI, 384, for a definition of "end" as "an object of free choice."
15 MdS, VI, 396.
16 For statements of this doctrine see MdS, VI, 385; also R, VI, 6-8n=pp.
5-7n. For extensive discussion by Kant of his view that all action, including
action from duty, is action for the sake of an end, see, in addition to the
references above, the I ntroduction to the second half of MdS and Chapter
II of KdpV.
17 G, IV, 402.
18 G, IV, 422.
19 What is distinctive about this account of maxims is the claim that they
include a statement of the end for the sake of which the proposed kind of
action will be performed. Though this point has clear textual support, it
has seldom been noted.
20 See the references in note 16, above.
21 This proposal has no basis in the Kantian text. In fact, it is clear that Kant
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did not think of maxims as having ce teris paribus clauses attached to them.
This point is proposed here only because of the difficulties from which it
frees Kant's philosophy of action.
22 G, IV, 422.
23 See note l.
24 G, IV, 424.
25 See KdpV, V, 21, 22.
26 See G, IV, 413, where Kant says, "All imperatives are expressed by an
ought."
27 "Kant's Examples of the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative"
(Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1957), 50-62), p. 60
28 Kant's Ethical Theiory (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp.
32-33.
29 See R, VI. 30 = pp.25-26, and R, Book 1, passim.
30 David Lyons, in Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (London: Oxford
University Press, 1965), p. 57, comes to an analogous conclusion for
utilitarianism: "Therefore, the only legitimate candidates for inclusion in
the description of an action for the application of a form of utilitarian
generalization are causal or consequentially significant properties, that is
..... causal properties in virtue of which the universal performances of acts
of that kind would produce some utility or disutility."
31 The fme points concerning what promises are broken and what are not
need not detain us here. We can confine our attention to clear cases of
promises broken and promises not broken, if we choose.
32 See the references in note 7.
33 For example, see MdS, VI, 423-4, 426, 428, and passim, to 458.
34 I wish to acknowledge the readings and helpful comments given earlier
versions of this paper by Stephen Barker, Maurice Mandlebaum, Phillip
Scribner, Robert Dewey, and John Diehl.
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